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REFLECTIONS UPON THE FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 
Paul R. Verkuil * 
The "administrative process" has been studied extensively over 
time, but the roles and qualifications of those who pass judgment in 
that process have not been examined with equivalent rigor. Thus, 
we know from scholarly research and from statutes and case deci-
sions much about the nature of administrative procedures. How-
ever, the people who actually make that process operate are little 
known except to those who are directly involved in the system-the 
litigants and the lawyers (government and private) who appear 
before them. As a result, these deciders are aptly named the "hid-
den judiciary." 
Not surprisingly, the federal administrative judiciary, like the 
administrative process itself, has grown and evolved significantly 
over the years. The public is not aware of these changes. There-
fore, it is important to "discover" and to illuminate the administra-
tive judiciary in order to understand its seemingly infinite variety. 
Such an analysis is fundamental to any assessment of administrative 
justice because the quality and fairness of the process can be pre-
dicted only by understanding its key element: the administrative 
judge. 
In order to define the universe of the administrative judiciary, 
the scope of inquiry must be limited. At the outset, the study must 
be limited to those administrative deciders-whether they are la-
beled "judges," "examiners," or something else--who actually pre-
• President and Professor of Law and Government, The College of William and 
Mary. This Article was presented in oral form at a UCLA Law School symposium on 
Nov. I, 1991. It grows out of a study of the administrative judge commissioned by the 
Administrative Conference of the United States at the request of the Office of Personnel 
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side at some kind of hearing, whether formal or informal. 1 
Therefore, this study will not encompass the millions of decisions 
that are rendered by countless other deciders who adjudicate public 
rights, opportunities, or obligations in other settings that are non-
confrontational and often not even face-to-face. 2 As a practical 
matter, these deciders are the "invisible judiciary," and they have 
not yet been subjected to systematic study. 
There are, however, two categories of ~dministrative deciders 
about whom we can aggregate data. First, there are the established 
Administrative Law Judges (AUs) who have been anointed by the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to preside over formal hear-
ings. 3 The second category is far more amorphous, but can still be 
distinguished from "non-hearing" deciders. The deciders in this 
category are frequently called "administrative judges" or "hearing 
examiners." They do not enjoy the benefits or insulation from 
agency control as AUs do under the APA. 
This Article will focus on these two categories of administra-
tive deciders. It will assess their qualifications and experience, and 
it will analyze the type of proceedings over which they preside. At-
tention will be directed at how they are selected, their range of com-
pensation, and, of critical importance, the degree of independence 
under which they operate. A complete picture of our federal ad-
ministrative judiciary should emerge from this study, and an agenda 
of unresolved issues shall be raised for subsequent consideration. 
I. See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975) (defin-
ing the components of informal hearings). There has been some scholarly study of the 
Administrative Law Judge ("AU"), notably that of now Justice Scalia and Professor 
Rosenblum. See, e.g., Rosenblum, Contexts and Contents of "For Good Cause" as Crite-
rion for Removal of Administrative Law Judges: Legal and Policy Factors, 6 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 593 (1984); Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco-A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57 
(1979). 
2. Deciders in this category may include those who make initial grants or denials 
of benefits (such as National Science Foundation applications) or rights of access to 
government facilities (for example, the park rangers who control access to national 
parks), and similar officials. They can be distinguished from the administrative judici-
ary by the fact that they render their decisions in a non-hearing context. This does not 
mean, of course, that they are outside the ambit of due process concerns if their deci-
sions affect private rights or benefits. See generally Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adju-
dication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739 (1976). 
3. Under the APA, when a statute requires agency adjudications "to be deter-
mined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," AUs or the agency head 
must preside. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-57 (1988). In 1972 the term "AU" was substituted 
for "hearing examiner." See 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (1972). See generally Cramton, A 
Title Change for Federal Hearing Examiners? "A Rose by Any Other Name ... ", 40 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 918 (1972). 
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It will become dear that the system under which ALJs and 
other administrative deciders are chosen is a matter of happen-
stance, not rational determination. From the arguments presented, 
there will emerge a recommendation to Congress and to the respec-
tive federal agencies that administrative judges be chosen on a more 
coherent basis that relies upon the importance of the decision being 
made. 
I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 
The term "federal administrative judiciary" is not frequently 
used, but it highlights the relationship between the administrative 
decision system and the federal judiciary. Administrative deciders 
are significant participants in our constitutional scheme. The recent 
case of Freytag v. CIR 4 recognizes many of these deciders as "infer-
ior officers" under the appointments clause contained in Article II 
of the U.S. Constitution. A study of the two categories of adminis-
trative deciders-the ALJ and the more generic category of admin-
istrative judge-follows. 5 
A. TheAU 
Administrative Law Judges as a group are among the most di-
versely talented, well-trained, and deeply entrenched adjudicators 
in our system, even when they are compared with the federal dis-
trict and state judiciary. There are almost 1,200 ALJs who are as-
signed to 30 federal agencies. 6 This is approximately equivalent to 
the number of judges on the federal trial bench. While it is impossi-
ble to compare their respective workloads in any meaningful way, 
the ALJs probably decide more "cases" each year than do their fed-
eral judicial counterparts. 7 
4. Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, IllS. Ct. 2631 (1991) (holding 
that special trial judges of the Tax Court are "inferior officers" under Article II, § 2, cl. 
2, and that the Tax Court itself is a "court of law" under that provision). 
5. Despite the possibility of confusion based on similarity of titles, it seems prefer-
able to label the latter category in a positive way rather than simply as "non-AUs." 
6. Statistics provided by Office of Personnel Management (Oct. I, 1991) (the pre-
cise total was 1,184 on that date, of which over 800 were in the Social Security Adminis-
tration). By comparison, there are about 636 federal district judges deciding cases in 
the federal courts. If bankruptcy judges and magistrates are included within the defini-
tion of the federal trial bench, then the total number (I ,250) would approximate the size 
of the AU corps. Statistics provided by Federal Judicial Center (Aug. I, 1991) (636 
federal district judges, 291 bankruptcy judges, and 323 magistrates). . 
7. The Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reports that for 
the year ending June 30, 1991, there were 207,742 civil cases and 47,035 criminal cases 
filed in the district courts. Report Highlights Judiciary's Workload, THE THIRD 
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In terms of salary, the ALJs cost the government about $100 
million per year. (They receive an average annual salary of about 
$83,000.)8 By contrast, the 636 federal district judges (who receive 
annual salaries of$125,000 each) cost about $80 million per year. If 
the salaries of bankruptcy judges and magistrates are included (at 
$115,092 each), their service costs the government another $70 mil-
lion or so. Thus, the federal investment in ALJs is two-thirds that 
of the entire investment in the trial-level judiciary. This is a signifi-
cant commitment of resources to a cadre of deciders who often go 
overlooked in the federal decision universe. 
As the government may rightly expect, AUs are impressively 
credentialed. A survey concludes that twenty-one percent of them 
attended "prestigious" law schools and that ninety-four percent 
graduated in the top half of their respective classes (thirty percent 
graduated in the top ten percent).9 They average fifty-eight years in 
age, are ninety-plus percent white males, and fifty-five percent of 
them were attorneys for the federal government before they became 
AUs. 10 The ALJs acknowledge that they enjoy less prestige than 
do federal judges. 11 Nonetheless, in education, training, and experi-
ence, they seem no less qualified than bankruptcy judges and magis-
trates, if not members of the federal bench. Moreover, ALJs, unlike 
federal district judges, are chosen in a nonpolitical way by an elabo-
rate selection system that is run by the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment. They enjoy a more secure tenure and compensation than do 
bankruptcy judges or magistrates because they do not serve terms. 
Rather, they effectively receive life tenure subject to removal for 
good causeY Consequently, AUs rank almost as high as the fed-
BRANCH, Sept. 1991, at 1, 1-3. Unfortunately, there is no comparable reporting of AU 
caseload, but the 30 agencies presided over by AUs would produce over 300,000 cases 
per year (with the bulk of them (250,000) in the Social Security Administration) based 
on earlier studies. See infra note 18. 
8. AUs are compensated in three categories: AL-l (3 total), AL-2 (IS) and AL-3 
(1166). There are eight steps in the AL-3 category based upon length of service. If one 
averages these salaries, they amount to $82,364 per AU with a 3.5% raise received in 
January 1992. Telephone interview with Robert Ball, OPM Office of AU (Oct. 25, 
1991). 
9. See P. BURGER, JUDGES IN SEARCH OF A COURT: CHARACTERISTICS, FUNC-
TIONS, AND PERCEPTIONS OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 106-11 (1984) 
(based on 1978 survey data). 
10. /d. 
11. /d. 
12. Bankruptcy judges and magistrates serve term appointments of 14 years. An 
AU may be removed "only for good cause established and determined by the Merit 
Systems Protection Board on the record after opportunity for hearing before the 
Board." 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (1988). There have been only a few such removals since the 
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era1 bench in terms of job security. These protections provide ALJs 
with a certain degree of judicial independence. However, they are 
by definition bound by the decisional authority of the agencies for 
which they work. 
The investment of public resources in these non-Article III 
"judges" testifies to their importance in our adjudicative universe. 
Yet their work remains largely unappreciated, if not unknown, and 
their role in the AP A's administrative scheme continues to be am-
bivalent. They remain a highly qualified and well compensated 
cadre of deciders which has yet to find a secure and defined role in 
our administrative structure. 
B. The Emerging Category of "Administrative Judge" 
One reason that ALJs are in a state of flux is that there are 
other administrative deciders who do similar work but who are 
neither comparably protected in their independence nor compen-
sated at similar levels. 13 As a result, whereas the ALJs as a group 
rival the federal trial judiciary and adjuncts in both number and 
compensation, they are numerically overshadowed by another 
group that is almost twice the size of the AU corps and decides 
more cases, but does so with less prestige, compensation and job 
security. This second group may be the real hidden judiciary. 14 
In an effort to determine the universe of non-ALJ hearings that 
are conducted by federal agencies, the Administrative Conference 
conducted a survey in 1989. 15 The survey found that there were 
eighty-three types of active cases, almost 350,000 annually, that 
non-AUs were conducting outside the APA formal-hearing frame-
work.16 These cases engaged over 2,600 presiding officers, either on 
APA was enacted. Therefore, ALJs enjoy a tenure not significantly different in practice 
from the members of the federal bench. In fact, a Senate committee has noted, "In 
essence, individuals appointed as ALJ's hold a position with tenure very similar to that 
provided for Federal judges under the Constitution." S. REP. No. 697, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 496-97. 
13. A recent study has collected valuable data on these non-ALJ hearings and pre-
siding officers. See ]. FRYE, SURVEY OF NON-ALJ HEARING PROGRAMS IN THE FED-
ERAL GOVERNMENT (1991) (study conducted for ACUS). 
14. See Robie & Morse, The Federal Executive Branch Adjudicator: Alive (and) 
Well Outside the Administrative Procedure Act?, 33 FED. B. NEWS & J. 133 (1986); J. 
Lubbers, Management of Federal Agency Adjudication 35-36 (May 16, 1991) (unpub-
lished manuscript). 
15. The survey, dated June 28, 1989, asked all agencies to list information about 
deciders who conducted oral hearings not required by statute to be on the record. See J. 
FRYE, supra note 13, at app. A. 
16. /d. at 4. 
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a full-time or part-time basis, who ranged in grades between GS-9 
and GS-16. 17 Thus, the "non-ALJ corps" is about twice as large as 
is the ALJ corps, and it carries a decision load that is at least the 
magnitude of that carried by the AUs. 18 For the first time we may 
now identify with some accuracy the decision world of federal ad-
ministrative law, at least at the hearing level. 19 These data invite a 
series of more detaile~ inquiries. 
When the non-ALJ hearing data are disaggregated, they reveal 
a concentration· in only a few case lmd decider types. By far the 
largest category of cases arose in the Executive Office of Immigra-
tion Review of the Department of Justice. This office accounted for 
about 152,000 of the 350,000 annual caseload, roughly forty-five 
percent of the total. This office employed about seventy-six full-
time "administrative judges."20 The next largest category of cases 
arose in Health and Human Services, where presiding officers em-
ployed by insurance carriers (whose numbers were not calculated) 
decided 68,000 cases per year, comprising twenty percent of the to-
tal caseload.21 The third largest category arose in the Department 
of Veterans Affairs, which decided 58,000 cases per year (seventeen 
percent). The deciders involved in disability and benefits determi-
nations ranged widely in experience, grade, and legal training. 22 
17. /d. at app. B. 
18. The estimate of AU hearings is difficult to make because statistics are not col-
lected outside the SSA context, where over 250,000 AU decisions were rendered in 
1990. See SSA OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS, KEY WORKLOAD INDICATORS 
3RD QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 1991 at 2 [hereinafter SSA-OHA ANNUAL REPORT]. 
The last effort to collect AU adjudication statistics for all agencies was done in 1980 by 
the Administrative Conference. See UNIFORM CASELOAD ACCOUNTING SYSTEM, 
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HEARINGS: STATISTICAL REPORT FOR 
1976-78 (1980) (documenting about 20,000 AU decisions outside of SSA). 
19. By drawing the line at "some kind of hearing," we exclude, of course, the po-
tentially larger category of non-hearing decisions made informally by the federal gov-
ernment which are beyond the scope of this Article. See supra note 1. 
20. J. FRYE, supra note 13, at app. B. The number of Immigration Judges is now 
approaching 100. Discussion with Chief Judge William Robie (Jan. 29, 1992). 
21. J. FRYE, supra note 13, at app. B. The use of private deciders as hearing of-
ficers in Medicare reimbursement cases was upheld over due process challenge in 
Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982). For a discussion of the due process re-
quirements for decider impartiality, see infra text accompanying notes 35-43. 
22. The VA employs 44 lawyers and 22 nonlawyers at grade GS-15, who sit in 
panels of 3 as the Board of Veterans Appeals. It also employs 1,692 nonlawyers on a 
part-time basis whose grades range from G-9 to GS-13. See J. FRYE, supra note 13, at 
app. B.; infra text accompanying notes 57-68. 
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These three agencies account for over eighty percent of the 
caseloads studied, 23 and they range through a remarkable variety of 
decider qualifications, from administrative judges to nonlawyer and 
even nongovernmental examiners. They employ procedures that 
range from the equivalent of formal AP A hearings to informal 
processes from which there is no appeal. These decisions are often 
similar to the kinds of decisions traditionally made by ALJs.24 It is 
not obvious why the presiding officil:il over these case types is some-
times an ALJ and sometimes a non-ALJ. Moreover, it is -not clear 
what case characteristics trigger the use of AP A formal hearings 
with ALJ presiders, in contrast to less formal hearings with non-
ALJ presiders. 
When Congress or the agencies choose to utilize an administra-
tive judge rather than an ALJ, they are opting for a decider who has 
less decisional independence, lower pay and benefits, and less job 
security. The selection and appointment procedures for administra-
tive judges are controlled by the agencies themselves. By contrast, 
the Office of Personnel Management oversees the AU appointment 
and selection process. Despite these differences, it appears that liti-
gants and the public do not object to the process by which adminis-
trative judges are selected. 
II. RATIONALIZING THE USE OF ALJS: MIXED SIGNALS FROM 
CONGRESS AND THE COURTS 
The search to understand why ALJs do not appear to be uti-
lized in a systematic way begins with Congress, but it also extends 
to the Supreme Court. On the one hand, both bodies have empow-
ered agencies to make decisions with less formality than would be 
required of the judiciary. At the same time, however, the increased 
latitude that Congress and the Court have granted administrative 
decision-making has blurred the line between those areas in which 
ALJs are required and those in which administrative judges will 
suffice. 
23. The other significant categories of cases are those conducted by the Coast 
Guard in the civil penalty arena (navigation, marine safety, and pollutant discharges) 
which number about 20,000 and are decided by 10 nonlawyer Coast Guard officers. 
(The high caseload per decider is explained by the fact that only about 7% of the total 
go to hearing.) See J. FRYE, supra note 13, at 43-44. Other significant caseloads in-
volve EEOC which uses about 79 GS-11 to GS-14 attorneys to decide about 6,227 cases 
and the Board of Contract Appeals which utilizes about 80 attorneys (grades ranging 
between GS-14 to GS-18) to decide some 5,000 cases. 
24. The similarity of the case types will be discussed in terms of the SSA and VA 
disability process at infra notes 54--69 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Due Process Clause and AUs 
In Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 25 the Court held that the Due 
Process Clause, as well as agency statutes,, could require the pres-
ence of APA hearing examiners. The case was quickly reversed-by 
legislative action that rejected the use of ALJs as presiding officers 
in immigration and deportation cases. The Court subsequently ac-
ceded to this legislative reversal. 26 By failing to equate due pro~ess 
requirements with formal hearings under the AP A, Congress and 
the Court greatly reduced the potential role of the AU. Neverthe-
less, in retrospect, the decision to decouple the use of ALJs and 
formal hearings from the Due Process Clause seems to have been 
the only sensible course. The "due process revolution" of the 1970s 
that was inspired by Goldberg v. Kelly 27 would surely have 
swamped the administrative decision process had AUs been re-
quired every time that procedural due process was invoked. 28 
In the 1970s another development occurred that expanded the 
potential use of ALJs. The Social Security Administration (SSA) 
had long utilized AUs, even though it was not required by the 
APA "on the record" hearing requirements to do so. By the 1970s 
the number of disability determinations had skyrocketed with the 
advent of expanded coverage.29 It quickly became apparent that the 
number of ALJs who were making disability determinations would 
far outstrip those making all other formal decisions in govern-
25. 339 u.s. 33 (1950). 
26. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1954). 
27. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Goldberg created a "due process revolution," in the late 
Judge Henry Friendly's words, by specifying in detail the procedural ingredients re-
quired to satisfy due process in the informal administrative setting (i.e., revocation of 
AFDC payments). Ironically, however, Goldberg mandated little in terms of decider 
independence, requiring only that deciders not have previously participated in decisions 
they are called upon to review. Id. at 271. See generally Verkuil, supra note 2, at 750 
n.45. 
28. The demise of the right-privilege distinction and the concomitant rise in the 
number and kind of interests protected by due process, see, e.g., Board of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), created a veritable landslide of due process adjudications at 
the state as well as federal level that could potentially have been included within the 
AP A formal hearing requirements. The realization that the administrative decision sys-
tem could be overwhelmed by these new procedural rights undoubtedly contributed to 
the Court's modification of them in cases like Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 
(1976). 
29. In 1972 Congress established the Supplemental Security Income (SSl) pro-
gram. In doing so, it did not initially require ALJs to preside over SSI cases. See House 
Comm. on Ways and Means, Social Security Amendments of 1971, H. REP. No. 231, 
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 156 (1971). Later Congress converted SSl hearing officers into 
ALJs. See Pub. L. No. 92-216, § 371, 91 Stat. 1559 (1977) (codified at note to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1383 (1988)). 
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ment. 30 Remarkably, this expanded use of ALJs emerged without 
AP A compulsion in that no "on the record" hearing was mandated 
in the disability context. 
In Richardson v. Perales 31 the Court made it clear that the so-
called "three hat role" of the ALJ (representing the claimant, the 
government, and impartial decider) was entirely consistent with 
statutory and constitutional norms. 32 Thus a new category of ALJ 
who presided over benefactory rather than regulatory decisions 
emerged. These ALJs had the unusual distinction of conducting 
informal rather than formal hearings; in return they received a 
lower grade (GS-15 rather than GS-16).33 By presiding over infor-
mal, non-lawyer-dominated hearings, ALJs departed from their 
traditional association with the trial-type process that had been con-
templated by APA formal adjudication procedures. Nevertheless, 
different though it may have been, this category expanded the ALJs' 
use dramatically. It also raised the prospect that ALJs could be 
used in other non-formal hearing settings,34 and it effectively ex-
panded the relevant qualifications and talents that ALJs needed in 
order to preside effectively. 
As it endorsed the use of AUs in the informal setting of SSA 
disability proceedings, the Court also accepted a low threshold for 
decider independence outside the AP A formal hearing context. In 
Arnett v. Kennedy 35 a divided Court allowed a government em-
ployee to be disciplined by his superior for making statements 
30. In a sense, the SSA disability story demonstrates what might have happened 
had Congress accepted the Court's invitation in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 
33, 33 (1950), to equate due process hearings with APA formal hearings more generally. 
Today almost 3 out of 4 AUs make SSA disability determinations. If SSA had not 
decided to utilize AUs, the number and influence of those deciders would have been 
sharply reduced. 
31. 402 u.s. 389 (1971). 
32. See id. at 410. The three hat role was necessitated by the fact that in those days 
there were few attorneys for claimants and none representing the government. Obvi-
ously had the formal hearing requirements of the APA been mandatory, the separation 
of functions requirements would have forbidden the AU to assume total control of the 
process. 
33. Only recently has the two-grade ALJ structure been replaced. See supra note 
8. 
34. For example, the use of AUs to preside over non AP A informal rulemaking or 
as members of agency appeals boards has long been advocated but not readily 
embraced. 
35. 416 U.S. 134 (1974). In dissent, Justice White expressed the view that this kind 
of biased decision-maker had not been accepted under due process standards since Bon-
ham's Case. /d. at 171. In Bonham's Case, 8 Coke 114a, liSa, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 
(1610), Lord Coke announced the fundamental proposition of natural justice that no 
man can be a judge in his own cause. 
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against that superior. Similarly, in Withrow v. Larkin 36 the Court 
permitted the potential conflict of interest that exists when the in-
vestigatory and adjudicatory functions are combined into a single 
entity in the state informal hearing context.37 For due process pur-
poses the Court seems willing to narrow the bias or conflict of inter-
est inquiry into one involving only pecuniary interests.38 
Moreover, the Court has encouraged experimentation with cre-
ative decision techniques that question the need for any type of gov-
ernment deciders, not only ALJs. For example, in Schweiker v. 
McClure, 39 the Court upheld, against due process challenges alleg-
ing bias, the use of non-lawyer, privately contracted deciders to re-
solve Medicare reimbursement claims.40 This remarkable decision 
effectively contradicted established notions of decider formality by 
not only privatizing the deciders but also placing them beyond the 
exclusive control of the legal profession. Moreover, the Court re-
fused to mandate an administrative or judicial appeal process as 
part of a due process requirement.41 
It is fair to say that by the 1990s the Court has moved towards 
greater decisional freedom under the Due Process Clause. From its 
earlier position in Wong Yang Sung of equating due process to for-
36. 421 u.s. 35 (1975). 
37. /d. at 55. The Court may have reasoned that this combination of functions at 
the state level had its counterpart in the organizational structure of many independent 
federal agencies, such as the FTC, where the Commission in effect approves the com-
mencement of investigations and issuance of complaints by its enforcement staff and 
then sits in judgment on the resulting case. 
38. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411. U.S. 564 (1973), makes this distinction clear. The fact 
that a private board of optometrists was authorized by state law to regulate their com-
petitors (with possible pecuniary benefit) condemned the arrangement under due pro-
cess standards. See also Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) 
(invalidating the practice of allowing municipal mayors to determine traffic violations 
and impose fines, which accounted for a substantial portion of village revenue); Tumey 
v. Ohio, 278 U.S. 510 (1927) (holding unconstitutional the practice of allowing munici-
pal mayors to determine Prohibition violations and impose fines payable to their 
municipalities). 
39. 456 u.s. 188 (1982). 
40. Justice Powell likened the private deciders in the case to government officials. 
"The hearing officers involved in this case serve in a quasi-judicial capacity, similar in 
many respects to that of administrative law judges." 456 U.S. at 195. The comparison 
seems questionable, if not invidious, since AUs are obviously better trained and have a 
higher status than the private contract deciders involved in hearing reimbursement 
cases. 
41. /d. at 198-99. Subsequent to this decision Congress provided for an appeal to 
an AU in cases where the amount in controversy is $500 or more. Pub. L. No. 99-509, 
§ 934l(a)(2)(B) (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395(b)(2)(B) (1988)). This 
amendment is yet another illustration of the different view that Congress and the courts 
often take about the necessity for formality in deciders or process. 
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mal AP A hearings, the Court has evolved from the Goldberg re-
quirement of specifying procedures for due process to a world that 
can readily accept an informal process of infinite variety. In this 
environment the decider need not be AP A-qualified, nor must the 
AP A formal hearing process serve as a baseline. This informal pro-
cess, which is not defined by the AP A, remains an amorphous com-
peting model. 42 The only informal processes contained in the AP A 
are the bare bones procedural guidelines of section 555.43 The ques-
tion whether an informal process can be generalized from existing 
agency practices remains uncharted territory under the AP A. 
B. Congressional Reactions to Decider Formality 
Over the last forty years Congress has not sent consistent sig-
nals about the use of ALJs either. Congress intended the APA to 
leave to individual agencies the discretion whether to employ AUs, 
restricting the requirements for AUs to those agencies whose or-
ganic legislation mandated "on the record" hearings. Of course, the 
AP A was drafted against a background of existing statutes that 
contained the "on the record" requirement. Therefore, many regu-
latory agencies instantly were required to employ AUs in 1946.44 
The first task that the Civil Service Commission faced in 194 7 was 
to determine whether incumbent deciders at these agencies with "on 
the record" statutes were qualified to serve as "hearing officers" 
under the AP A. 4s 
Once the AP A was launched, however, Congress has not ex-
panded the number of agencies required to use APA-qualified hear-
ing examiners, even though those agencies perform work that is as 
important as those with "on the record" requirements. Congress 
simply has not added significantly to those agency statutes that re-
quire "on the record" hearings, even though the expanded use of 
42. See Gardner, The Procedures by Which Informal Action is Taken, 24 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 155 (1972). 
43. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990). See 
generally Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. 
REV. 258 (1978). . 
44. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 
5 u.s.c. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3344 (1988)). 
45. The failed attempt to review individually the qualifications of these 197 incum-
bent hearing officers rather than accept them as a group is told in Fuchs, The Hearing 
Examiner Fiasco under the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 HARV. L. REV. 737 
(1950). See also Scalia, supra note I (discussing present day problems of appointment 
and grading of ALJs). 
1352 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1341 
ALJs was the basic premise of the APA.46 Indeed, Congress has 
instead accepted-if not endorsed-the large category of non-ALJ 
administrative judges that exist throughout government. 47 
On the other hand, Congress has increased the independence 
and stature of existing ALJs in several significant ways. In ac-
cepting the Civil Service Commission's conversion of APA hearing 
examiners to administrative law judges, it did much more than 
merely approve a name change.48 This decision effectively legiti-
mated a federal administrative judiciary. It sanctioned the estab-
lishment of a corps of deciders who today rival federal and state 
judges in terms of their qualifications and benefits. And this trend 
continues. Recently, Congress further boosted the status of ALJs 
by approving a new pay structure that eliminated the two-grade sys-
tem and increased their salary. Both of these developments suggest 
that Congress is not fully comfortable with the more limited role of 
hearing examiners originally contemplated by the AP A. 
These achievements surely suggest that one of the more effec-
tive lobbies in government involves ALJs and their support group, 
the organized bar.49 The bar has been single-minded in its insis-
tence that the value of decider independence can be best served by 
utilizing ALJs in the formal hearing setting. Lawyers quite natu-
rally desire to conform the administrative process to the judicial 
process with which they are most comfortable. The current debates 
in Congress that surround the desirability of an independent ALJ 
46. Of course the fact that Congress accepted the use of ALJs in the SSA disability 
hearing process even without the on the record requirement has vastly enhanced their 
number and influence. 
47. Congress also approves by statute the specific use of non-AUs in contexts 
where ALJs are also used, such as the Merit Systems Protection Board. In the latter 
situation, ALJs and non-AUs are used to decide disciplinary cases. The MSPB em-
ploys 66 administrative judges, who make initial decisions in personnel appeals involv-
ing federal employees, and one AU who is required by statute to hear initial decisions 
in cases brought by agencies against other AUs. See 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (1988); 5 C.F.R. 
§ 1201.131 (1991). 
48. In 1978 Congress amended the U.S. Code to endorse the title "administrative 
law judge" which had earlier been adopted by the Civil Service Commission. Act of 
Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183 (1978); see also 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 
(1972). 
49. The ABA has long supported enhancements to AU independence as well as 
expansion of the role of ALJs. In 1986, for example, the ABA gave an award to the 
Social Security ALJs for upholding the integrity of administrative adjudication by at-
tacking in court agency mandates for decision quotas and percentage outcomes. See 
Bono, Administrative Report, JUDGES' J., Winter 1992, at 23, 41. 
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corps are part of this ongoing effort to judicialize the administrative 
process. 5° 
However, it is not clear that the continued concern over de-
cider independence at the administrative level will enjoy sustained 
support. The cost of using ALJs rather than other decider alterna-
tives and the problems that heightened decider independence can 
cause for caseload management have generated resistance within 
agencies, and have helped spawn the expanded use of non-AUs 
documented herein. Thus, these conflicting approaches may well 
cause Congress to reconsider the ALJ role in the future. 
Ill. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ALJ 
Ironically, ambivalence towards the use and role of ALJs is 
related to the quality that many perceive as their greatest asset: 
their strict independence from participant or agency control. This 
very quality motivated the drafters of the AP A to create the formal 
adjudication process in 1946.51 However, while the APA protected 
the ALJ from improper agency control over the decision process, it 
also ensured that the outcome of ALJ decisions would rest formally 
in the hands of the agency head. 52 This compromise over the func-
tions that AUs perform under the APA serves to confuse their role 
today. The ALJ acts independently in all significant respects during 
the course of the decision process, but once her decisions are made, 
they are not granted the respect of finality or even deference. 
Today disputes over ALJ independence are rarely about funda-
mental issues such as ex parte contacts or agency coercion; rather, 
they involve trivial squabbles over perquisites and benefits. 53 Legiti-
mate agency reservations about the ability to control AUs' per-
formance under the AP A are growing. In the process, these 
concerns have spawned the variety of non-ALJ deciders discussed 
here. Since the Supreme Court has established that administrative 
50. See, e.g., S. 594, 10lst Cong., lst Sess., 135 CoNG. REC. S27ll-l3 (daily ed. 
Mar. 15, 1989). One can also read the recent legislation which subjects the decisions of 
the Veterans Administration to (limited) judicial review as further evidence of Con-
gress' interest in judicializing the administrative process. See Veterans' Judicial Review 
Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 38 U.S.C.). 
51. Before the AP A, hearing examiners were described by Congress as biased and 
partisan. See Scalia, supra note l, at 57. 
52. The final decision is that of the agency and no deference is due the AUs deci-
sion. See 5 U.S.C. § 557 (1988). 
53. See Moss, Judges Under Fire: AU Independence at Issue A.B.A. J., Nov. 1991, 
at 56, 59 (documenting AU complaints over agency assignment of parking spaces and 
attendance at training conferences). ' 
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decider independence rarely poses a serious due process issue, agen-
cies (and Congress itself) are free to seek more efficient alternatives. 
In this setting the question becomes whether the use of AUs is 
good policy, not whether they are necessary to satisfy fundamental 
notions of fairness. In making the policy determination, indepen-
dence becomes a variable, not a constant. It must be subjected to 
scrutiny before deciding to formalize administrative deciders any 
further. 
A. AU Independence as a Challenge to Agency Control: The 
Social Security Administration and the Veterans' 
Administration 
As anyone who labors in the academic community will attest, 
the security of tenure has costs as well as benefits. This is no less 
true with regard to ALJs. Once one passes the point at which inde-
pendence is a due process desideratum, it becomes an issue that is 
part of any tradeoff between management efficiency and decider 
prerogatives. Today that is the framework within which the issue is 
debated. Indeed, the continuing saga of the SSA's attempts to place 
productivity and quality-control standards on the ALJs who decide 
its disability cases captures the current debate well. 
Since Social Security AUs decide so many cases that have sim-
ilar fact patterns, to which they apply a single legal standard and to 
which they are assigned randomly, the SSA naturally desires to im-
pose uniform standards of case management to achieve greater con-
sistency in outcomes. A decision system that handles an excess of 
250,000 cases annually and that employs upwards to 800 ALJs can-
not ignore the ·search for systemic solutions. However, these man-
agement techniques have a tortured history. The agency has 
experimented with decision "quotas" to try to regularize the 
number of cases that are decided_ by each ALJ per month. Inas-
much as the cases are assigned randomly, the SSA has also experi-
mented with "goals" for allowance rates as well. The SSA and its 
independent-minded ALJs are locked in a continuing struggle over 
the proper parameters of these management standards. 54 
54. See Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 812 (1989) 
(upholding agencies setting of "reasonable production goals"); Association of Admin. 
Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1984) (criticizing the agency's use of 
allowance rate goals); see also Social Security Admin. v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321 
(1984) (rejecting removal of an AU based upon demonstrated low productivity-less 
than 50% of agency wide average of 31 cases per.month). 
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From a management perspective, there is no doubt that pro-
ductivity and even allowance-rate goals are sensible control mecha-
nisms. However, when faced with a corps of independent deciders 
who view themselves as the functional equivalent of federal district 
judges, and who are willing to go to court and to Congress to defend 
their claims to independence, there is not much an agency can do to 
force caseload management. Indeed, this seems to be the conclu-
sion that has been reached by the SSA and its Office of Hearing and 
Appeals. It has jettisoned controversial techniques such as work-
load quotas and non-acquiescence in court of appeals decisions. ss 
The agency has concluded that quotas and allowance-rate goals 
should be abandoned because they are of limited use in a system of 
independent deciders. 56 Today the battle for management control 
at the SSA seems to be over, a fact which is corroborated by no suits 
having been filed by AUs against the agency during the last five 
years. 57 
The SSA-AU experience is the prime example of the tension 
between management control and decider independence. It has 
subsided primarily because of the strength of the AUs on the inde-
pendence issue. The political lessons of this experience are clear: 
Management techniques are no match for claims of independence. 
Once the ALJ is chosen as a decider, judicial-type prerogatives 
place control over the process in his or her "court." The decision 
arena reflects a setting where individual decision-making_ prevails 
over attempts to regularize outcomes on a statistical basis. 
But imagine another reality. Suppose that deciders other than 
AUs were chosen to decide disability cases. Would management 
techniques be easier to implement? Could the outcomes be differ-
ent? It so happens that there is a disability decision system of com-
parable magnitude to the SSA that does not employ ALJs. The 
55. The agency has also had its fights with the courts. In order to help achieve 
uniform policy it has refused to accept as precedent some decisions of federal courts. 
This practice has attracted the ire of the courts, Congress, and the bar. See Estreicher 
& Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 
(1989). The agency's nonacquiescence poHcy was reversed by regulation in 1987. 
56. Conversation with Michael J\strue, General Counsel, Dep't of Health and 
Human Services (Dec. 12, 1991). · 
57. This inaction has also led to a significant drop in appeals to the federal district 
court from AU decisions from over 29,000 in 1984 to about 10,000 in 1989. See DI-
RECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1989 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 7 ( 1989). Another factor affecting appeal rates to the federal courts may simply 
be that the rate of decisions favorable to the claimant has gone up from less than 50% in 
the 1970s to over 62% in 1990. Also, partially favorable decisions have been possible 
since 1986. See SSA-OHA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 2. 
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Department of Veterans' Affairs handles about 4.5 million claims 
annually. The agency initially decides these cases by utilizing over 
1,600 non-lawyer deciders in regional offices. This group is compa-
rable to the state officials who initially decide SSA disability cases. 
Obviously, the state deciders are less susceptible to management 
control by the SSA because they are not directly employed by the 
administrative agency. Thus, the DVA disability system has the ad-
ditional advantage of greater agency control over the initial applica-
tion stage. 
Appeals from the DVA regional offices go to the Board of Vet-
erans Appeals (BVA) which holds hearings and sits in three-person 
panels (two GS-15 lawyers, one GS-15 medically trained official). 
These panels are designated as non-adversary in nature. 58 There are 
66 BVA members, and they render over 44,000 decisions annually.59 
There is no judicial appeal on the merits from the BVA decisions, 
although the Court of Veterans Appeals has recently been installed 
as an Article I court of limited review.60 
There are many similarities and differences between the SSA 
and the DVA. First, they have in common a massive decision bur-
den; second they must apply a myriad of individual circumstances 
to a complicated disability standard. They differ in that the DVA 
deals with a designated portion of the public that Congress specifi-
cally wants to benefit, whereas the SSA deals with the needs of the 
population as a whole. 
There is no easy way to decide whether one system renders 
"better" or more correct decisions than the other. Both have elabo-
rate internal mechanisms for achieving fair and efficient decisions, 
although the SSA also has available the corrective of judicial re-
view. When ALJ decisions are reversed in significant number by 
the district courts,61 a further control on decision quality exists that 
does not, by definition, apply to previously non-reviewable BVA de-
58. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.103 (1991). 
59. Statistics provided to author by DVA personnel in October 1991. 
60. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 4051-52 (1988); Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. 
L. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.); see 
also Stichman, The Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988: Congress Introduces Courts 
and Attorneys to Veterans' Benefits Proceedings, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 365 (1989). 
61. In some years, district courts have reversed up to 50% of the time. Statistics 
provided by SSA-OHA (Nov. 27, 1991) (in 1984 and 1985, the reversal rate for AU 
neared almost 50%). Currently the reversal rate is around 20%. /d. 
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ctstons. Today the Court of Veterans Appeals performs that qual-
ity-control function in certain respects.62 
As a practical matter, one can only conclude that the two deci-
sion systems are different, not "better" or "worse." BVA members 
are not ALJs (although they would like to be63), and they sit in 
panels. The advantage of panels is that they tend to decide by con-
sensus and are therefore more likely to reach a more correct (or less 
extreme) resu~t. 64 This should be even more true in circumstances 
where one of the three panelists is medically trained, since medical 
issues are central to the disability determination. 65 
A disadvantage of panels could be their cost. Still, the cost 
need not be triple. Only one opinion is written, and methods for 
achieving decisional efficiency are readily developed by the panel-
ists.66 Moreover, if one takes a rough cut at the number of cases 
that are decided by the BVA, in contrast to those decided by the 
individual ALJs at the Social Security Administration, the produc-
tivity issue seems to disappear. The 66 BVA members decide about 
44,000 cases per year, an average of 666 cases per member annually 
(or 55 cases per BVA member monthly).67 This total compares fa-
vorably with the ALJ "suggested" monthly average of 31 cases. 68 
62. Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.); see Stichman, supra note 60. 
63. BVA members currently serve terms of six years. They are considering asking 
Congress to convert them to AUs with the equivalent lifetime tenure. Conversation 
with VA personnel (Oct. 1991). 
64. In research done on SSA decision-making, regression analysis showed that re-
formulating AUs in panels of three tended to cut off the tails of extreme grants or 
denials. See J. MASHAW, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. 
CARROW, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS 21-27, 43-46 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter Soc. SEC. HEARINGS & APPEALS!. 
65. The Court of Veterans Appeals appears to have limited the significance of the 
medically trained BVA panel member by requiring panels to refute medical evidence 
only through consideration of other expert medical evidence and not through general 
conclusions reached by the panels and their medically trained members. See, e.g., Col-
vin v. Derwinski, No. 90-196 (U.S. Ct. Vet. App. Mar. 8, 1991). This ruling could well 
eucourage the Veterans Administration to discontinue the use of medical members on 
panels and utilize them instead as experts. Discussion by author with VA officials. But 
there is no evidence that the removal of medically trained members from BVA panels 
would lead to better decisions; in fact, the presence of these decision experts can give 
credibility to the decision process that is lacking in the SSA program. 
66. See Soc. SEC. HEARINGS & APPEALS, supra note 64, at 43-45. 
67. The BVA denies benefits in about 75% of the cases it reviews, a denial rate 
significantly higher than SSA-AUs who deny only about 25%. See supra note 57. 
68. See cases cited supra note 54. If one simply divides the number of cases de-
cided in 1990 by the number of AUs assigned (258,181 -:- 696), the average is approxi-
mately 371 cases per AU per year, or 30.9 per month. See SSA-OHA ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 18, at 1-2. 
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This comparison of two similar decider schemes suggests sev-
eral conclusions. If AUs are not necessarily better or more efficient 
deciders than are BVA members, what is their advantage in this 
context? Indeed, when many similar cases have to be decided in 
circumstances where consistent outcomes are desirable, maximum 
independence of deciders may not be an institutional asset. 69 It is at 
least arguable, in other words, that the great value of the AU-that 
of decisional independence-is wasted in a system where caseload 
management must be the critical variable. This does not mean that 
ALJ independence lacks value in other decision contexts. Indeed, 
the case for decider qualifications varies with the kind of case to be 
decided. ALJ independence can be a crucial ingredient to fair deci-
sion-making in circumstances where institutional pressure may af-
fect outcomes on the individual case. 
B. AU Independence as an Assurance of Objectivity 
While one could infer from the above discussion that AUs are 
not necessary in the benefits context, the use of an independent AU 
could still be quite significant in other contexts. Consider those 
cases where one's liberty is at stake or where the government seeks 
to enforce its will upon individuals. These "enforcement" cases re-
quire deciders who enjoy maximum independence from agency con-
trol because their work is closest to that of federal district judges in 
criminal and civil cases. One growing category of cases of this 
kind-administered by the Department of Justice-does not utilize 
AUs. The Office of Immigration Review decides 152,400 immigra-
tion cases per year.70 Each of these cases involves decisions of criti-
cal importance to the individual, such as whether an alien must be 
deported or excluded from entry to the United States. 
The procedures employed by the Office for Immigration Re-
view in deportation and exclusion cases embody most of the re-
quirements of APA formal adjudication,71 and the Executive Office 
for Immigration Review has become functionally separate from the 
69. This is a much debated issue. On one side are representatives of claimants who 
believe fervently that judicial review of AU decisions is the best way to ensure correct-
ness; on the other side is scholarly research which suggests that an internally managed 
system is the best way to create overall norms of correctness or at least consistency. See 
J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 
CLAIMS (1983). 
70. See J. FRYE, supra note 13, at 28. 
71. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(b) (1988); 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1 n.7, 242.1 (1991). 
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Department. 72 The Department has responded to some criticism of 
its ·approach to independence of the administrative judges, but the 
Department has resisted the logical extension of immigration judges 
to ALJs. Perhaps the reasons for its reluctance are historical since 
the Wong Yang Sung case and its aftermath specifically freed the 
immigration process from the du~ process strictures of the AP A. 73 
Perhaps the reasons are more practical. Not many agencies favor 
th~ ALJ selection process that the OPM requires74 or the degree of 
independence that ALJs asSert from agency control.75 For 
whatever reasons, immigration judges remain a category of deciders 
who function much like ALJs but do not achieve their level of sta-
tus and independence. 
Another category of deciders who also make decisions that re-
quire maximum independence and integrity are those administra-
tive judges who adjudicate the grant or denial of security clearances 
for Defense Department contractor personnel. Unlike the immigra-
tion judges, this small cadre of eight ~eciders has a caseload of 
about 650 annually. However, they decide matters of grave impor-
tance to individuals who are often unable to work in their chosen 
fields without the requisite security clearances. 76 These cases are 
administered by the DOD's Directorate for Industrial Security Re-
view (DISCR). As a military function, this agency is exempted 
from the APA,77 but its procedures are controlled by executive or-
der.78 The presiding officers who hear security clearance cases are 
GS-15 lawyers. Recently the ABA has recommended that they be 
converted to AUs to ensure their independence from the DOD.79 
72. See Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REv. 1141, 
1195-98 (1984) (discussing legislative attempts to create an independent immigration 
agency within the Department of Justice). 
73. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text; see also Schuck, The Transfor-
mation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. I (1984). 
74. The selection process leads to the creation of a register that limits the agency's 
choices to the top three candidates. See sources cited infra notes 80--81. Moreover, 
there may be fiscal reasons not to use AUs. The AUs are paid on a new schedule 
which is greater than the GS-15 level of immigration judges. But see infra note 88. 
75. Testifying in opposition to a bill to convert immigration judges into AUs, the 
late Attorney General William French Smith stated "'[A]bsence of accountability ... 
would only compound existing management problems.' " Verkuil, supra note 72, at 
1196 n.323 (citation omitted). 
76. See, e.g., Cafeteria and Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); 
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). 
77. See 5 U.S.C. § S54(a)(4) (1988). 
78. See Exec. Order No. 10,865, 3 C.F.R. 398 (1959-1963) (setting out the proce-
dures and rights of those seeking security clearances). 
79. See generally AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON VOLUN-
TARY DISCLOSURE OF THE PUBLIC CONTRACT LAW SECTION (1987). 
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The agency has not yet taken a position on that issue, but it might 
be expected to resist this idea much as the Department of Justice 
has resisted with regard to immigration judges. 
In these classes of cases, the maximum independence of AUs 
has much to offer. Understandably, the institutional values of the 
agencies potentially conflict with the goal of highly independent fact 
finding. Even if such were not the case-and it may well not be-
the perception of independence will be better assured by the use of 
AUs, rather than agency-controlled administrative judges or hear-
ing examiners. 
IV. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF AUS: AN 
AssESSMENT 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates how uneven and un-
planned is the use of AUs in our administrative decision system. 
While AUs are clearly a formidable corps of decision-makers, they 
compete against less protected groups of deciders who have equal 
magnitude and strength. Obviously, Congress and the agencies 
must believe that deciders other than ALJs can offer greater advan-
tages; otherwise, this decider variety would not exist. Not surpris-
ingly, the two reasons for this variability that seem to make the 
most sense relate to control and cost. They are both legitimate 
agency concerns. 
The "control" issue does not implicate due process issues that 
might stem from improper agency contacts with deciders. Rather, 
the "control" issue concerns questions regarding management ac-
countability and the selection process. The management accounta-
bility problem has already been discussed in connection with SSA 
disability decision-making. In general, agencies are dissatisfied with 
the OPM selection process that requires them to select ALJs from 
among a restricted list of candidates who may not best meet agency 
needs. Moreover, the strict use of the "Veterans preference''80 fur-
ther restricts agencies' opportunities to appoint qualified women 
and minorities. 81 
80. Congress mandates a preference for veterans for all government positions, but, 
with respect to AU selection, it has a precise tie-breaker effect of 5 to 10 points on a 100 
point scale. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2108, 3309 (1988). 
81. The number of women and minorities on the AU corps are undoubtedly held 
down by the Veterans preference. Since 1984, veterans have composed about 39% of all 
AU applicants and 67% of all appointees. As of March 1990, 5.41% of AUs were 
women, 2.93% were black and 2. 75% hispanic. Statistics provided by Office of Person-
nel Managers/Office of Administrative Law Judges ("OPM/OAU") (Mar. 25, 1991). 
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Agencies that do hire ALJs from the OPM register have devel-
oped a variety of means to ameliorate the restrictive effects of the 
register, 82 but those that need not select from it have an easier time 
creating their own list of deciders. For example, at the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review, immigration judges are hired much 
as are government attorneys who are part of the exempt service. 83 
It is understandable why agencies would prefer to avoid the ALJ 
hiring process if they are not compelled to use it. Therefore, reform 
of the selection process should be (and is) a concern for OPM as 
well as for the agencies and Congress. 84 , 
The other obvious reason that ALJs are not preferred is their 
salary and benefit levels. In most agencies the number of Senior 
Executive Service (SES) positions is strictly limited and is subject to 
careful negotiation. Under their new pay scale, AUs are compen-
sated at SES levels. 85 Agencies that are not now bound by the for-
mal adjudication provisions of the AP A are not likely to seek 
inclusion when doing so would significantly raise the cost of their 
decider corps. 
There is another aspect to the compensation and grade issue 
that has broader, institutional meaning. Presently, the ability of 
agencies to utilize non-ALJ deciders at grade levels that vary from 
GS-9 to GS-15 allows for a hierarchy of decider qualifications that 
could create a fertile selection pool for future ALJs. The creation of 
a multigrade structure for ALJs was part of the original plan that 
was rejected in favor of the gradual movement to today's single-
grade for AUs. 86 It may be that the presence of a wide variety of 
deciders at various grades and qualification levels could form a use-
ful pool of potential applicants for ALJ positions. Congress has 
eliminated this possibility within the ALJ corps by approving the 
current single-grade structure. But what of the long-standing con-
fusion over when to utilize ALJs altogether? Congress has estab-
82. Agency use of "special" registers and the practice of hiring transfers from other 
agencies (notably the SSA) has granted them some flexibility. Interview with Lee Wal-
lis, OPM/OAU (Dec. 1990). 
83. Discussions with William Robie, Chief Immigration Judge (Jan. 29, 1992). 
AUs on the other hand are deemed by OPM to be members of the competitive service. 
See 5 U.S.C. § 3325 (1988). 
84. The ACUS study of which this Article is a part is concerned with this issue in a 
broader context. 
85. See supra note 8. 
86. See Scalia, supra note I at 62-75 (describing-and arguing for-the original 
APA plan which utilized promotions of AUs to higher grades as a quality control 
technique). The use of multigrade "examiner" positions was specifically approved by 
the Supreme Court in Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conf., 345 U.S. 128 (1953). 
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lished no reliable indicator that conveys when to require ALJs as 
deciders and when to permit other agency options. Ironically, agen-
cies are increasingly inclined not to employ AUs if they can avoid 
it. Still they seek some of the benefits of ALJ status for their non-
ALJ deciders. This issue deserves some attention for it threatens to 
remove the multigrade aspects of the non-ALJ decider pool. 
For example, several bills currently pending in Congress are 
designed to give ALJ-like protection and benefits to non-ALJs with-
out calling them ALJs. One bill gives such protections to adminis-
trative judges. Another, the Merit Systems Protection Board, 87 
offers comparable salary benefits to immigration judges. 88 A third 
does so for the Board of Veterans Appeals. 89 These initiatives sug-
gest that Congress is further balkanizing the administrative judicial 
process without any overall consideration of decider uniformity 
issues. 
A more systematic approach is needed for Congress and the 
agencies to determine when to utilize ALJs and when to accept the 
less independent variety of administrative judges. One suggestion is 
to incorporate into this analysis the hierarchy of values that are im-
plicit in the concept of flexible due process.90 The courts and com-
mentators have ·employed this approach in the past to evaluate 
specific administrative procedures,91 but it can easily be extended to 
decider qualifications alone. The argument for ALJs would be 
87. See H.R. 3879, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CoNG. REc. HIO, 930 (daily ed. 
Nov. 22, 1991). 
88. SeeS. 2099, 102d Cong., lst Sess., 137 CoNG. REC. Sl8,417-l8 (daily ed. Nov. 
26, 1991) (establishing a special pay scale for immigration judges just below that of 
ALJs). In submitting the bill, Senator Kennedy commented: "Clearly, the responsibili-
ties and duties of immigration judges are on an equal standing with that of administra-
tive law judges, in terms of both their level of authority and complexity of issues 
adjudicated." 137 CoNG. REc. Sl8,417 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991). One might fairly ask 
why not just convert immigration judges to ALJs if this is correct? 
89. See H.R. 3950, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CoNG. REC. Hll,885 (daily ed. Nov. 
26, 1991) (making BVA pay comparable to that of ALJs). 
90. The late Judge Friendly's article, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REv. 
1267 ( 1975), has been enormously influential in the Court's formulation of a flexible due 
process concept. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Judge Friendly 
places government actions that deprive individuals of liberty at the top of a scale of 
individual interests-termination or reduction of government benefits are placed lower 
down the scale. Friendly, supra, at 1295-98. Interestingly, Judge Friendly suggested 
that the further the tribunal or decider is removed from the agency, the less may be the 
need for other procedural safeguards against bias. /d. at 1279. Thus one could con-
struct a case for using independent ALJs in an nonformal hearing context, much like 
has been done at SSA. See supra text accompanying notes 51-79. 
91. The author's work in this area involves the application of an interest value scale 
to informal procedures. See Verkuil, supra note 2; Verkuil, supra note 72. 
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strongest in situations where individual liberty is at stake and 
weaker where the disbursing of government benefits is involved. On 
this scale, the use of ALJs in the immigration context takes on 
heightened importance whereas ALJ use in the disability-benefit 
arena seems entirely optional. Certainly the ability to experiment 
with a variety of decider qualifications in non-individual liberty sit-
uations should be encouraged. Innovations such as panel decisions, 
nongovernment (or nonlawyer) decision-makers and multigrade 
classifications should be studied. 
But in the area of individual liberties the arguments against the 
use of ALJs grow weaker. Moreover, in circumstances where elab-
orate efforts are made to grant procedural protections that are 
equivalent to the AP A and decider benefits that are comparable to 
those of AUs, one wonders why Congress or the agency does not 
mandate the use of ALJs. If an administrative judge looks like an 
AU and talks like an AU and acts like an ALJ, why not make him 
or her an ALJ? That question is surely pressed in connection with 
immigration judges, but it also applies to DOD judges who decide 
security-clearance cases. It may also apply to Merit System Protec-
tion Board judges. Assuming that legitimate grievances about the 
selection process for ALJs are addressed, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to maintain a satisfactory distinction between ALJs and ad-
ministrative judges in these settings where liberty or rights to em-
ployment are being determined. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The federal administrative judiciary offers a stunning diversity 
of decider qualifications, benefits, and independence. The present 
system is a function of history and agency choice more than of con-
gressional plan. The AP A itself only began the process of profes-
sionalization of the decider corps; forty-five years later it is 
incomplete. The advantage of the current scheme is its experimen-
tal range. We are at the stage now, however, where some system-
atic rethinking of the choice between ALJs and generic 
administrative judges might be appropriate. This Article is in-
tended to raise the subject for further debate and study. 
